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Short title: Evolving Foresight in a Transition Economy
Abstract
Hungary launched her first Technology Foresight Programme (TEP) in 1997. This was a
holistic foresight programme, based on panel activities and a large-scale Delphi survey, with a
strong emphasis on socio-economic needs. The paper discusses why a foresight exercise is
relevant to a transition country, then describes what was done (organisation, methods and
results), and how the process evolved in Hungary. Policy conclusions, methodological lessons
and questions for further research are also offered.
The heritage of the former system, the transition process itself and the current level of socio-
economic development all played a decisive role throughout the programme. TEP was set up
as a programme controlled by non-governmental experts, and in turn, the Steering Group
delegated a great deal of autonomy to the panels. Thus, methods were refined continuously.
Given the fundamental socio-economic changes in Hungary and the enlargement of the
European Union a strong emphasis was put on scenarios – both at macro and panel levels –,
and a large number of Delphi-statements featured non-technological issues. However
developing qualitatively different visions, and aligning macro and panel futures, proved to be
a difficult and challenging task.
Keywords: technology foresight, innovation system, visions (futures), economic transition,
Hungary
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1. INTRODUCTION
Hungary launched her first Technology Foresight Programme, TEP in 1997. The country
was undergoing fundamental economic and social changes, and major institutions were
being shaped. It was therefore a suitable time to think about medium and long-term
issues: how to improve quality of life and enhance long-term international
competitiveness. Foresight was perceived as an appropriate tool to bring together
business, the science base and government in order to identify and respond to emerging
opportunities in markets and technologies.
TEP was a holistic foresight programme, based on both panel activities (scenarios,
SWOT analysis, policy proposals, etc.) and a large-scale Delphi survey. It put more
emphasis on socio-economic needs than on scientific and technological (S&T) issues
per se.
The foresight process proved to be more challenging than originally envisaged. It
was truly a learning process in many respects, for all the interested parties. For instance,
many participants’ mindsets were still framed by the legacy of central planning, and thus
developing qualitatively different visions took several rounds in the case of some panels.
For the Steering Group, one of the major methodological difficulties was to align the
macro and panel futures (visions), given their different level of analysis and the unique,
inherent logic and structure of the panel issues. Some policy-makers, more accustomed
to the linear model of innovation, and hence the dominance of technological issues, also
found it hard to interpret and utilise the foresight results. Most business people,
however, were rather quick in understanding the significance and benefits of these
methods, e.g. establishing new contacts with each other and researchers through the
programme.
The paper seeks to unveil the dynamics and key elements of the foresight process
by analysing the reasons behind launching TEP, summarising the results achieved up to
2001 and discussing some methodological issues. It draws on the author’s experience as
the programme director of TEP in 1997-2000 – hence it is bound to be somewhat
‘subjective’ –, discussions with participants as well as foresight experts and practitioners
in other countries. Section 2 discusses briefly the question of why to conduct foresight in
general and in a transition country. Details of TEP – what was done, how it was
managed and how the results were disseminated – are described in Section 3. Various
TEP activities are assessed in Section 4, with a view on how methods evolved in the
course of TEP. Some specific policy and methodological conclusions are already offered
throughout the sections discussing various aspects of TEP, while the more general
lessons and dilemmas, questions for further research are summarised in the concluding
section.
2. FORESIGHT: DEFINITION AND RATIONALE
The increasing number of foresight programmes suggests that foresight can be a useful
policy tool in different national innovation systems. As a growing body of literature
analyses this surge, the major factors explaining the diffusion of foresight can be
summarised in a telegraphic style:
2 Globalisation, sweeping technological and organisational changes, as well as the
ever-increasing importance of learning capabilities and application of knowledge
have significantly altered the ‘rules of the game’. Thus, governments have to take on
new responsibilities (as well as dropping some previous ones), while firms must find
new strategies to remain, or become, competitive in this new environment.
 Decision-makers face complex challenges: socio-economic and technological factors
interact in defining issues of strategic importance, e.g. competitiveness; quality of
life; environmental issues; education and life-long learning; regional disparities.
 The prevalence of flat organisations leads to new decision-making methods and
more responsibilities for groups and individuals, and thus new skills and behaviour
are required (e.g. problem-solving, communication and co-operation skills in multi-
disciplinary, multi-cultural teams, as well as creativity). This, in turn, creates new
demands on the education and training system.
 Various types of clusters and networks (business – academia, business – business,
both at national, international levels) and other forms of co-operation have become a
key factor in creating, diffusing and exploiting knowledge and new technologies,
and therefore in satisfying social needs and achieving economic success.
 Quite often technological changes occur and diffuse before policy-makers can fully
understand the mechanisms at work and socio-economic repercussions so as to
formulate appropriate policies (e.g. the recent developments in biotechnology,
especially cloning and stem cell research).
 Governments try hard to balance their budgets, while cutting taxes, and hence they
need to reduce public spending relative to GDP. Accountability, too, is becoming
increasingly important in democratic societies. Public R&D expenditures are subject
to these demands.
 Policy-makers also have to deal with intensifying social concerns about new
technologies (e.g. ethical and safety concerns in the case of biotechnology and
nuclear energy, fears of unemployment and social exclusion caused by the rapid
diffusion of information and communication technologies).
 In sum, participative, transparent, forward-looking methods are needed to find responses
to the above challenges. Technology foresight – a systematic means of assessing
scientific and technological developments, which could impact on industrial
competitiveness, wealth creation and quality of life – offers an essential tool for this
endeavour. It helps in making choices in an ever more complex situation by discussing
alternative options, bringing together different communities with their complementary
knowledge and experience. In doing so, and discussing various visions with
stakeholders, it also leads to a more transparent decision-making process. Foresight
processes can reduce uncertainty, too, because participants can align their endeavours
once they arrive at a shared vision. Many governments have already realised the
importance of foresight activities, and thus this relatively new technology policy tool is
spreading across continents. (Fleissner, 1998, Gavigan and Cahill, 1997, OECD, 1996,
Technological Forecasting and Social Change [Vol. 60])
 The above general considerations apply in transition countries, too. A number of
pressures – especially the need to change attitudes and norms, develop new skills,
facilitate co-operation, balance budgets – are even stronger than in advanced countries.
3Moreover, these countries also have to cope with the challenges of transition: loss of
former markets (hence the need to find new ones); weak international competitiveness;
relatively poor quality of life and brain drain. These all point to the need to devise a
sound, appropriate innovation policy, and strengthen their innovation systems. Here,
foresight can be a useful tool.
 Foresight, however, is not a panacea; it cannot solve all the problems listed above,
and cannot even solve any of them just on its own.
 
 
 3. AIMS, METHODS AND RESULTS OF TEP
 3.1. Background
 3.1.1. Systemic changes and economic performance
 As a result of the first phase of the transition process in Hungary, the most important
political and economic institutions have been re-established: a parliamentary democracy
based on a multi-party system, private ownership of assets, free factor and commodity
markets and the stock exchange.1 Some crucial economic institutions – e.g. a two-tier
banking system, a ‘Western-type’ taxation system (VAT, personal income tax) – were
introduced as early as 1987, that is, preceding the systemic changes. Most firms and
banks were privatised by the mid-1990s, mainly by foreign investors, i.e. ‘genuine’
owners (as opposed to ‘artificial’ ones created by various voucher schemes in other
transition countries).
 After a sharp decline in the early 1990s, the Hungarian economy is ‘bouncing
back’. Inflation and unemployment rates declined while GDP grew by 4.4-5.2%
annually in 1997-2000. GDP thus has reached the ‘pre-transition’ level, that is, 1989, by
1999. Foreign direct investment is the highest per capita – since 2000 ‘neck-to-neck’
with the Czech Republic – compared to other Central and Eastern European countries.
 
 3.1.2. Fragmented national system of innovation
 In market economies networking, that is, communication and co-operation among
innovative firms and other organisations involved in knowledge production plays a
crucial role. (Freeman 1994, 1995, Freeman and Soete, 1997, Lundvall and Borrás,
1998, special issue of Research Policy on innovation systems [volume 31, No. 2]) In
Hungary, however, exploitation of scientific results for economic and social purposes
was rarely a success until the end of 1980s, in spite of a relatively strong and successful
research system (reflected by publication and citation indices). Academia-industry links
were rather weak and ad hoc, as well communication and co-operation among other
players. Moreover, crucial organisations required for a strong national innovation
system either did not exist, or did so only in a distorted form (the so-called bridging
institutions, as well as financial, trade and legal services specialising in meeting the
needs of innovative enterprises). In brief, innovation was not regarded important, and
hence it did not receive adequate attention, resources and institutional backing. (Hanson
and Pavitt, 1987, Havas, 1999)
                                                
 1 The stock exchange was already re-opened in 1989, i.e. before the political transition.
4 In the early years of transition this fragile system was further weakened: former
links were cut off as firms were privatised, R&D institutes reorganised, and R&D
expenditures – both public and private – drastically reduced. Since the mid-1990s,
favourable developments have occurred, however. Some bridging institutions have been
set up and international R&D co-operation has intensified. Foreign firms have brought
new technologies in, and diffused them among their suppliers. The number of business
R&D units has increased – some of them have been set up by foreign firms –, and firms
have started again joint projects with universities and research institutes. (Havas, 1999,
2001, Inzelt, 1996, 1999, 2000, OECD, 1993, TEP, 2001) Yet, attempts to devise and
implement a coherent set of policy tools to strengthen the innovation system have failed.
(Havas, 2002)
 Until 1996-97, the most frequently mentioned argument was the alarming deficit
of the government budget. However, money is always a scarce resource, and when a
country is in a particularly difficult situation then there are even more pressing reasons
to devise and implement a sound strategy. From a broader perspective, one might
identify further, even more compelling reasons. Sobering lessons of the former socio-
economic system (poor economic performance in spite of the so-called central
development programmes), and partly ideological, partly socio-psychological stances
were at odds with the apparently increased role of government. Moreover, there are
vested interests against concerted efforts, as government agencies usually prefer not to
share their resources with other ones even if this may lead to more efficient public
spending.
 Further, in the first ten years of transition there were strong illusions and
misconceptions concerning R&D and innovation activities and policies. One of these
was that scientific knowledge would automatically become technological capability;
hence no specifically designed schemes would be needed to facilitate this process. Also,
in the first half of the 1990s, it was widely believed that economic development and
S&T efforts can be separated, and thus R&D expenditures can be cut without severe
socio-economic consequences. The irony is that this view was not without foundations
in the specific Hungarian circumstances: given the poor economic performance during
the planned economy period, return on R&D expenditures was a largely neglected issue,
on the one hand, and new technologies brought in by foreign investors ‘in bulk’ in the
early 1990s facilitated a quick industrial re-structuring and market re-orientation without
much local R&D inputs, indeed, on the other. Yet, there is a major policy problem with
this view. Although economic development can be maintained, or even accelerated,
without indigenous R&D and innovation efforts in the short run thanks to foreign direct
investment, a country opting for this ‘development’ path becomes not only overly
dependent on foreign technologies, but would most likely to lose its attractiveness, too:
at best becoming the ‘dumping site’ of outdated technologies, or even abandoned by
foreign manufacturing firms altogether. From a different angle, this way of thinking
clearly cuts innovation from R&D, considering the latter one to be a luxury, or a
privilege for a narrow elite – ignoring the abundant evidence accumulated by the
economics of innovation and all the policy implications. (EC, 1995, Ergas, 1987,
Freeman and Soete, 1997, Levin et al., 1987, Lundvall and Borrás, 1998, Nelson, 1993,
OECD, 1992, 1998a, 1998b, 2000)
5 By the late 1990s, it became obvious that the Hungarian innovation system should




 3.2. Objectives and organisation of TEP
 As the so-called transformational recession (Kornai, 1994) turned into economic growth
by 1996-97, some policy-makers thought it was time to think about medium and long-
term issues. TEP, therefore, was launched in 1997 to
 devise viable R&D strategies and identify technological priorities;
 strengthen the formal and informal relationships among researchers, business people
and civil servants;
 support the preparation for the accession negotiations with the European Union.
It was also decided that – following the methods of the first British technology
foresight programme – panels should be set up to develop scenarios as well as policy
recommendations, and a two-round, large scale Delphi-survey should also be conducted.
The above objectives and methods were designed in 1996-97 by studying other
foresight programmes2 and then discussing Hungarian policy needs with officials of
OMFB, National Committee for Technological Development, the government body then
responsible for devising and implementing R&D policy.3 The final decision to launch
TEP was taken in April 1997 by the Council of OMFB, the major decision-making body
of OMFB.
3.2.1 Political considerations
The OMFB Council was a 15-strong committee appointed by the Prime Minister,
consisting of high-ranking representatives (secretaries or deputy secretaries of state) of
six interested ministries and the research community, business people and an
independent expert. The Council had to approve the strategic goals OMFB, together
with the policy schemes to implement them, and the allocation of the Central
Technological Development Fund among these schemes. Given the Council’s
responsibilities and its composition, one might assume that there was a strong policy
demand for foresight, and TEP thus enjoyed a strong support from the outset. However,
                                                
2 The preparatory studies, analysing the British, Dutch, French, German, Japanese and US experiences as
well as forecast and foresight methods in general, were written by a group of researchers, including Judit
Balázs, Éva Hideg, Judit Mosoni-Fried, Erzsébet Nováky and Dániel Székely. This project was co-
ordinated and finally summarised in a feasibility study by Katalin Balázs. Hungarian Science and
Technology attaches were also asked to compile reports on foresight programmes conducted in countries
where they were stationed.
3 OMFB was set up in 1965, and reorganised several times in the 1990s. Space limits prevent a thorough
discussion of these details, their political background and policy implications. In 1994-99 it was rather
independent – although formally supervised by the Ministry of Economic Affairs –, i.e. its responsibilities
and status were fairly close to the ones of the Office of Science and Technology in the UK. Since January
2000, it has operated as the R&D Division of the Ministry of Education, with significantly less autonomy.
Havas, 2001 provides a detailed description of all these administrative changes and their corollaries (e.g.
in terms of organisational culture and policy approaches).
6one might also think of the example of the first British foresight programme, launched
by the government (not a single agency), which obviously lends even stronger political
support. There were a number of reasons not to opt for that solution in Hungary.4
First, given the 4-year cycle of general elections, the next elections were to be held
just in a year, in 1998, and thus launching TEP as a government programme seemed
somewhat risky: it might have been ‘hijacked’ during the election campaign, and in the
case of a change of government, seen by the new one as something ‘alien’, that is,
initiated by their political rivals. Second, it was also clear that obtaining a ‘rubberstamp’
from the government would be a lengthy and cumbersome process. Moreover, it was
also uncertain if the incumbent government would give its support, given the low
importance attached to innovation policy by both – politically opposite – governments in
1990-98. (Biegelbauer, 2000, Havas, 1999, 2001, Inzelt, 1996) Third, given the legacy
of central planning, it was also important to launch a ‘bottom-up’ expert-driven
professional programme rather than a ‘top-down’, centralised, politically laden one.
Because these intentions had to be made credible, it seemed to be a better solution to
initiate TEP by the OMFB Council in which civil servants, business people,
representatives of the research community and innovation policy experts took decisions
together.
3.2.2. Participants and management
For the above reasons, nobody was involved from either OMFB – the government
agency that financed the programme – or the OMFB Council in making decisions e.g.
on panel topics, issues to be analysed, priority-setting, etc. Hence, no OMFB-official sat
either on the Steering Group of TEP, or was a member of any panel.5 All the major
decisions have been taken by the Steering Group, the panels themselves or at joint
meetings of the Steering Group and panel chairs and secretaries. (After a few months, it
became a routine to held SG meetings jointly with panel chairs and secretaries in order
to have a direct communication among those who made decisions concerning the whole
programme and those who were conducting most of the analysis. In other words, the
danger of creating two discrete entities – ‘us’ and ‘them’ – was diminished this way.)
A Programme Office – first with 3 employees (including a secretary) and in 1998-
99 hiring two more colleagues – was set up in June 1997 to co-ordinate TEP and to
provide methodological, organisational and logistics support for the Steering Group and
panels. The Programme Office reported to the President of OMFB, and once a year
submitted a progress report, including a project plan with a proposed budget for the
following year, to the OMFB Council.
Ministries, interested government agencies, professional associations and
chambers were asked in July-August 1997 to nominate Steering Group members,
emphasising that they were not supposed to represent any organisation, but participate
actively in a strategic discussion process, relying on their knowledge and experience.
Relying on these nominations, a Steering Group of 20 leading industrialists, academics
                                                
4 Discussions with the then President of OMFB in 1997-98.
5 For a brief comparison with the first British foresight programme, the Chairman of the Steering Group
was the Head of the Office of Science and Technology.
7and government officials – deliberately comprising a majority of industrialists and
academics with close contacts with businesses – was appointed by the OMFB Council in
October 1997 to oversee the Programme.
A few months later an Inter-ministerial Committee was also established,
comprised of representatives of ministries and government offices, as a vehicle for a
two-way communication: to discuss the preliminary results of TEP and provide
information on their on-going strategic projects for the Steering Group and panels.
3.2.3 Objectives revisited: the importance of process
The objectives of TEP were refined by the Steering Group as to identify new market and
technology opportunities and devise adequate responses in order to achieve long-term
competitiveness, and improve quality of life. In other words, the overall objective was to
contribute to a strategy for a socially, economically and environmentally sustainable
development.
More specifically, the goals were defined as follows:
1. contribute to a national innovation strategy based on a comprehensive analysis of
 technological development,
 world market opportunities (new markets and market niches),
 strengths and weaknesses of the Hungarian economy and R&D system,
2. help Hungarian firms improve their competitiveness by providing the results of the
above analysis,
3. strengthen the formal and informal relationships among researchers, business people
and civil servants,
4. spread co-operative and strategic thinking,
5. support integration into the European Union,
6. formulate recommendations for public policies.
The first, second and fifth objectives can only be achieved if researchers, business
people and government officials join intellectual forces to assess Hungary’s current
competitive position and impacts of likely global market and technological trends.
Hence, their re-aligned and re-invigorated relationships are actually means to achieve
TEP’s two principal goals (enhanced competitiveness and improved quality of life).
However, the process in which these experts with different backgrounds communicate
and share ideas concentrating on longer-term issues, generate consensus, and co-operate
with increased commitment in devising and realising a national strategy, was deemed so
crucial that it was marked as an end in itself. (Martin, 1996)
Hungary had already been preparing to join the European Union when TEP was
designed. Accession to the EU is likely to shape Hungary’s future to a significant extent,
and it thus requires a clear and sound vision about Hungary’s role and opportunities in
the enlarged European Union. It was expected that TEP would contribute not only to the
accession itself, but also to the integration process by providing visions and diffusing
new decision-making methods, as well as fostering changes in norms, attitudes and
behaviour.
8It was also anticipated that the results – and in the case of the participating
business people the foresight process itself – would also assist Hungarian firms in
devising and implementing strategies to improve their competitiveness.
With the benefit of hindsight, the preparatory phase can be seen as an ‘unnoticed
early warning’ on the overall nature of TEP is: methods and objectives were discussed
in several rounds and even revised already in the very beginning. Yet, at that stage no
one thought that this continuous adaptation – albeit always within the original ‘terms of
reference’ – would be an important characteristic of TEP.
There are two main reasons for the constantly evolving nature of TEP. First,
foresight is a learning process even in those countries where previous programmes have
produced tacit knowledge, and lessons have been diffused either in codified forms or
through personal links. This learning obviously applies a fortiori in a country with no
tradition, and hence no experience, in foresight.
The second reason relates to the broader political and social psychological context
of TEP. To avoid being seen as a centralised, top-down programme, a conscious
decision was taken to give panels a great deal of autonomy.6 First only an 8-page
document, entitled Methodological Guidelines, was developed and distributed to panels,
and relatively short kick-off workshops were organised in March – April 1998. Later,
two specific training workshops were organised on the Delphi method with British and
German experts. Subsequently an outline (or ‘template’) for panel reports was
developed by TEP Office, and discussed jointly with panel chairs and secretaries at a
Steering Group meeting.
3.3. Methods and outcomes
TEP was conducted in three stages, namely pre-foresight (July 1997 – March 1998),
main foresight (April 1998 – May 2000), dissemination and implementation (June 2000
onwards) stages.
3.3.1. Pre-foresight
Awareness seminars were held across the country in the pre-foresight stage to promote
TEP among experts and professionals. Seminar participants and organisers (that is,
chambers of commerce and scientific associations) were also invited to nominate panel
members, together with ministries and government agencies. In the meantime, the
Steering Group decided to set up the following panels:
 Human resources (education, employment)
 Health
 Information technologies, telecommunications, media
 Natural and built environment
 Manufacturing and business processes (new materials, production processes and
management techniques, supplier networks)
 Agribusiness and food
                                                
6 A panel secretary at some point even likened this approach to the “management by exception” method.
9 Transport.
 Panel chairs and secretaries were appointed by the Steering Group, while panel members
were invited by chairs and secretaries, in either case relying on their own suggestions
and the nominations collected through the above consultation process.7
 
 3.3.2. Main foresight
 Panel reports
 The seven panels were specifically asked to start their activities by developing
alternative visions for the future. Of course, panel members had their own views on the
current situation when discussing futures, but the idea was to urge them to explore new
avenues, rather than to stick with the day-to-day difficulties. They then turned to the
present by analysing human resources, techno-economic performance, as well as
institutions and regulations in their respective fields. Panels mainly relied on the
expertise of their members, but commissioned reports from other experts as well. Their
tentative results were discussed within the wider expert community at workshops held
across the country, organised jointly with the regional chambers of commerce and
professional societies. All the background reports, the alternative visions and the
Delphi-results were posted on the Internet as soon as they became available.
(http://www.om.hu/j2tepuj.html) The final reports, relying on internal discussions,
background reports, the Delphi-results, as well as conclusions from the regional
workshops, were structured as follows: a critical appraisal of the present, alternative
futures (visions) and recommendations for realising the most desirable – but of course
still feasible – future.
 At the request of some panels, a separate expert group was commissioned to
analyse the field of energy, following the structure of the panel reports, but without a
Delphi-survey in this field.
 
 Delphi-survey
 Each panel formulated statements for a Delphi-survey by identifying the major trends in
Hungary and studying foreign questionnaires (the fifth Japanese, the second German, the
British and Austrian ones). The Delphi-statements were revised several times to ensure
that experts who were not panel-members would understand them in the same way.
Then, a small pilot survey – with 5-7 non panel-member experts for each questionnaire
– was conducted, leading to the final round of revision.
 Co-nomination (Nedeva et al., 1996) was used to identify potential respondents,
started with panel members in the first round. The entire Delphi-survey, including the
co-nomination process and the small pilot study to test the questionnaires, was
administered by a pollster company, selected at a public tender. The tender had not
specified either the size of the pool of experts or the method how to collect
questionnaires, only a target was set: around 200 questionnaires had to be returned in the
                                                
 7 The Steering Group set some guidelines for the latter selection process, emphasising the need to have
representatives of different schools of thought in a given field, the balance between age groups, genders
and those from the capital and other parts of the country. No rigorous statistical analysis has been
conducted to describe the panels, yet, it can be said safely that these guidelines were respected only
partially.
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first round so as to have a sufficient number of answers for statistical analysis. To
increase the response rate the contractor did not mail the questionnaires, but delivered –
and 2-3 weeks later collected – them personally.
 Each questionnaire consisted of 60-80 statements and the following questions:
 Respondents’ degree of expertise (options ranging from ‘unfamiliar’, ‘casually
acquainted’, ‘knowledgeable’ to ‘expert’)
 Respondents’ assessment of economic and social impact, and impact on
natural environment (options ranging from ‘strongly harmful’, ‘slightly
harmful’, ‘neutral’, ‘slightly positive’ to ‘significantly positive’)
 Period within which the event/development will have first occurred (including
“never”)
 Hungary’s current position vs. advanced European countries in the following
four respects: S&T capabilities, exploitation of R&D results, quality of
production or service and efficacy of regulation (options ranging from
‘unacceptable’, ‘lower level, but acceptable’, ‘fairly similar’, to ‘higher level’)
 Constraints: social/ethical, technical, commercial, economic, lack of funding,
regulatory standards, education/skill base (options: yes or no)
 Promotion of development, application: domestic R&D, purchase of licence,
know-how or ready-made products (ranking the relevance of these three policy
tools).
 The first round of the Delphi-survey was completed in May 1999. Some 1400
questionnaires were returned (i.e. on average 200 for each panel, as it was targeted). The
second round was completed by the end of 1999, in some cases with a disappointingly
low (50-60 per cent) response rate, despite special efforts to reach 70-80 per cent.
Although data were used by panels for their final reports, this rich set of data can – and,
indeed, should – be exploited by more detailed, more systematic analyses as well, for
instance by firms and research institutes for their own purposes as well as by policy
analysts, e.g. comparing the Hungarian results with foreign ones. (Preliminary analysis
has shown that around 20-40 per cent of the statements is comparable.)
 
 Steering Group report: macro visions and policy recommendations
 While only meso- (or panel-) level scenarios were envisaged initially, both the Steering
Group and a number of panels noted in the course of TEP the need to develop visions
for alternative futures at a macro-level, too. Having discussed a number of possibilities
at Steering Group meetings and various workshops with experts, eventually 3 macro
visions have been elaborated.8 These can be depicted as cells in a two-by-two matrix,
where the columns represent whether Hungary actively pursues a firm, well-designed
strategy, and the rows describe if there are fundamental structural changes in the global
context. (Figure 1)
 Figure 1 about here
 The actual content of ‘strategy’ (or ‘activity’) is determined by the intensity and
quality of the activities of the civil society, businesses and the government (including
                                                
 8 A group of experts – co-ordinated by Anna Vári and László Radácsi – drafted these scenarios in
September-October 1998, which were then discussed and revised in November 1998 – February 1999.
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the motivations and objectives driving their actions) and the interplay among these
players. In other words, this variable is understood here as what is implemented (rather
than what is planned).
 Knowledge-intensity is perhaps the most important feature of these macro visions.
Yet, it is not represented by a separate axis in Figure 1 because it depends on the actual
strategy. Specifically, active strategies pursuing a path of low knowledge-intensity (and
thus low value-added, low wages, weak local markets), or drifting along a knowledge-
intensive path, would not be plausible, and thus were excluded from scenario building.
 In all these macro visions, Hungary is integrated into the international division of
labour, as she is already part of the global and European economic and political systems;
the possibility of isolation(ism) was hence excluded.9
 Macro visions took into account demographic, societal, environmental, economic
and political factors as well as the physical infrastructure. Their major features are
summarised below.
 Co-operative partnerships
 In this vision, Hungary adopts an active strategy, based on mutual, shared benefits with
her foreign partners, and becomes more closely integrated into the world economy along
a development path of high knowledge-intensity. The pillars of this strategy are:
significantly increased support for knowledge generation and exploitation; high priority
for health and environment; and strengthening solidarity and social cohesion. In addition
to active government policies, the close co-operation between governmental institutions,
civil organisations and business communities play a crucial role at national, regional and
local level. These lead to a significantly improved quality of life and allow Hungary to
catch up with the medium-developed countries.
 Drifting
 This scenario assumes that Hungary becomes increasingly integrated into the global
economy over the next 20 years, and joins the European Union. However, due to the
lack of an active government strategy Hungary’s present semi-peripheral position is
reinforced. This trajectory is, at best, of a medium level of knowledge-intensity, which,
in turn, leads to an increasing foreign policy and economic dependence, and to a gradual
loss of the ability to influence social trends. Hungary is unable to fully exploit the
opportunities of international co-operation, especially those offered by the European
Union. The net results are a rapidly widening development gap internationally and
significantly deepening social divide internally.
 Alternative development
 This scenario presumes that a fundamentally new way of thinking and value system
becomes dominant in the world in some 40-50 years (as opposed to the 15-20 year time-
horizon of the previous two visions), whereby a socially and ecologically sustainable
globalisation prevails, based on co-operation. Technological developments are modest,
                                                
 9 The fourth logically possible option – Hungary is drifting on the sea of fundamental global changes –
was not elaborated either, because the other version of drifting was seen gloomy enough, and also hoped
to be a sufficiently ‘loud wake-up call’.
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appropriate, ‘harmless’, small-scale and prudent.10 The Hungarian civil society and the
government prepare for these fundamental changes in advance. This trajectory leads to a
new state of development, based on high quality education, new skills and cultural
standards as well as the widespread use of sophisticated technologies.
 Policy recommendations of the Steering Group aim at facilitating the first vision
(Co-operative partnerships), emphasising the importance of an educated, flexible and
healthy population and an appropriate, strong national system of innovation. (Fairly
similar policies can promote the third vision, too. In other words, the major factor
differentiating these two visions is the nature of global settings, and not the aims and
tools of the domestic policy). Of course, panels’ and Steering Group recommendations
should be understood as equally important elements of an integrated policy ‘package’.
 
 3.3.3. Dissemination and implementation
 Preliminary TEP results were disseminated and discussed at workshops and through the
Internet already in their first draft forms. The final reports, including policy
recommendations, were discussed by parliamentary committees, and were received
favourably; e.g. some of these committees (e.g. the ones on Health, Education and
Environment) specifically asked the responsible ministers to form task forces to analyse
how to implement policy recommendations put forward by TEP panels.
 Panel reports were also discussed at face-to-face meetings with government
officials responsible for devising strategic plans of ministries. Some of them expressed
their willingness to incorporate certain TEP proposals into their own policy documents
(e.g. Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Transport and Water Management, Office for
Government Commissioner in charge of Information Technology). A new Health
programme – co-ordinated by a member of the Health and Life Sciences panel of TEP –
was launched in 2001 by a newly appointed minister who used to be a member of that
panel, too. Finally, a new scheme, aimed at human resource development for R&D –
and fairly similar to a Steering Group recommendation, namely granting a sabbatical
year for scientists and engineers working for companies – was launched in 2002 by the
Ministry of Education.
 Yet, the implementation could have been faster, more extensive and better co-
ordinated with a stronger political support.
 
 3.3.4. ‘Process’ results: workshops, networks, new ways of thinking
 It is difficult to separate ‘products’ from the ‘process’, because the Steering Group, the
panels, the Delphi respondents and the workshop participants (i.e., altogether several
thousand industrialists, academics and government officials) all contributed to the
‘products’, that is, written, codified results. A lively and constructive, creative process is
essential to produce a high-quality ‘final product’, on the one hand. Without inspiring
‘semi-finished products’ – background papers, draft visions and reports –, on the other
hand, the ‘process’ cannot be triggered at all. Experts would not attend workshops were
                                                
 10 It is worth emphasising that this vision was drafted just before the first major demonstration against the
current form of globalisation in Seattle in November 1999.
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they not able to benefit from the process (e.g. in the form of learning and/or joining new
networks).
 The process in itself was a very important ‘result’. For instance, more than one
hundred regional workshops were organised by the end of 2000 to discuss the Delphi-
results, background papers, draft visions and policy proposals. These workshops are
likely to have contributed to the strengthening and re-focussing of existing co-operation
and communication among different communities. The extent to which these new fora
were useful, however, is very difficult to measure in an exact way.
 Yet, there are clear signs of new ways of thinking. One example is that the policy
recommendations of TEP took into account the complex, ‘multi-sectorial’ nature of
crucial issues, e.g. health, environment, info-society. Moreover, non-panel-member
experts also understood the significance of these new types of policies, and were willing
to ‘subscribe’ to them – as the policy workshops have shown. A real challenge is to
convince policy-makers to implement these policies, based on a new type of analysis.
This is going to be more difficult than reaching consensus in a professional community.
The learning process as a whole still has to be completed with this ‘lesson’.
 It also seems that a better understanding of the relationship between technological
and non-technological factors influencing the quality of life and competitiveness
evolved. This is explicitly reflected in the reports – especially in the policy
recommendations, see Table 1 –, and was discussed at some workshops.
 
 Table 1 about here
 However, there is a need for a systematic evaluation, conducted by independent
experts, in order to establish what process-type results and benefits have been achieved,




 4. ECONOMIC TRANSITION AND FORESIGHT METHODS
 
 4.1. Definition of panel topics
 4.1.1. Broad issues: socio-economic problems
 The OMFB Council resolution on TEP only stipulated that it should be a holistic
programme, and the choice of issues for panels was left to the Steering Group. Having
studied other programmes and taking into the Hungarian circumstances, two proposals
were drafted. Both proposals put emphasis on broad socio-economic issues, as opposed
to organise the panels either along scientific branches or economic sectors. The Steering
Group accepted the first version, with a smaller number of panels, i.e. representing a
more integrated approach. In short, TEP brought together various issues treated
separately in most other foresight exercises, and put socio-economic needs in the centre,
rather than following the logic of science and technology ‘push’.
 For example, the Health and Life Sciences panel has encompassed life sciences,
related fields of biotechnology, the health care system, pharmaceuticals and medical
instruments industries, but all from the point of the health of the population. Some of
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these issues were not analysed at all by other foresight exercises, while others were
treated in separate panels, e.g. life sciences (a ‘stand-alone’ panel in the first UK
foresight programme), pharmaceuticals (as part of the Chemicals panel in the same
programme). Also, agriculture and food processing belonged to a single panel in the
Hungarian foresight programme (as opposed to the first British one). Similarly, IT,
telecom and media were brought under the same ‘roof’.
 
 4.1.2. The importance of human resources
 TEP treated education and life-long learning as a major factor determining
competitiveness, and thus the Human Resources panel was always listed as the number
one – although the order of the further six panels did not reflect any priority. (In
contrast, learning was mainly understood as a market opportunity by the Leisure and
Learning panel in the first British foresight exercise.) Another sign of the importance
given to Human Resources is that seven policy proposals of the Steering Group – out of
22 altogether – are concerned with this issue.
 
 
 4.2. Cross-cutting issues
 In spite of defining broad fields as panel topics to be analysed, a strong emphasis was
put on the so-called cross-cutting (cross-panel) issues – again due to the lessons of other
foresight programmes. Panels were encouraged to identify, and adequately deal with
these issues when analysing major trends and developing alternative visions for their
fields.11 A workshop was also organised to analyse these issues when the first drafts of
the panels’ visions were completed. (TEP Office staff prepared matrices of issues,
actions to be taken, etc. panel by panel. Face-to-face, ‘bi- or trilateral’ meetings of
respective panel secretaries and members were also organised during and after the
workshop.)
 Although panels were set up around broad issues, real-life cases are even more
complex. They require expertise from many disciplines and economic sectors: e.g. our
health is influenced by a number of factors, among others by one’s life style, social
status, diet, housing and employment conditions, as well as the quality of the medical
care system and the environment. All these issues belonged to different panels, i.e. a
close and well-thought collaboration was required to carry out a reliable, thorough
analysis and formulate sensible policy proposals. Having recognised that need, some
panels joined forces, i.e. their budget, and commissioned together a group of experts to
analyse cross-cutting issues from different points of view. (For example the Health and
the Agribusiness and Food Industry panels set up two joint task forces to analyse jointly
healthy diet and allergy.) Given the legacy of the planned economy – that is, strong
‘departmentalism’ – and the inherent isolation of various disciplines, it can be regarded
an achievement in itself.
                                                
 11 A list of cross-cutting issues was developed at the very beginning of TEP, including, among others:
education, training and re-training; impacts, threats and opportunities of IT; environmental issues;
accession to the EU; competitiveness; social cohesion; the role of large (multinational) and small and
medium-sized (indigenous) firms; control and self-control of different systems and sub-systems; research
and development, manufacturing (services), marketing; new materials.
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 Two cross-cutting issues were also put into the Delphi questionnaire as variables,
namely impacts of a given event/development on the environment and lack of skills as a
potential constraint.
 There were a number of ‘cross-cutting’ Delphi-statements, too, e.g. those on
environmental issues but formulated by other panels (e.g. Health; IT, Telecom and
Media, Manufacturing and Business Processes). TEP Office staff collected these
statements, and the respective panels were urged to analyse them, i.e. both those panels
that formulated these ‘cross-cutting’ Delphi-statements and those which were ‘affected’
by these statements.
 The discussions of the panel and Steering Group reports clearly show that even
more systematic efforts – and probably more sophisticated methods – are required to
deal with these cross-cutting issues. There is also an obvious need to find appropriate –




 4.3. Strong emphasis on visions in an innovation system approach
 Fundamental institutions have crystallised in the advanced countries for quite some
time, whereas they are still being shaped in Hungary, given the transition process.
Moreover, coming back from the former Soviet bloc and attempting to join the EU,
which is also in a middle of a major transition process, the wider, international
institutional context, where Hungary tries to find her room, is changing. It is of the
utmost importance to analyse this turbulent environment, hence the emphasis on visions,
both at macro level (socio-economic framework conditions) and at the level of panels
(micro and meso issues).12
 Macro scenarios had not been developed in any other country engaged in foresight
activities by the time when TEP was designed, and – as already mentioned – they were
not part of the originally planned toolkit in Hungary either.13 Already in the first few
months of the main foresight phase, however, it seemed to be inevitable to develop
macro visions, too. The Steering Group did not want to impose anything on the panels,
though, and thus the idea was ‘frozen’ for a while. Yet, not much later, when the panels
realised the difficulties of building their own visions in the turbulent environment
referred to above, it was them, who were requesting the definition of socio-economic
framework conditions, as a point of reference. Then a joint preparatory work started,
involving some panel chairs and secretaries, as well as experts experienced in scenario
building. Various structures were discussed at workshops and Steering Group meetings,
attended by panel chairs and secretaries. First an outline was approved, identifying
‘strategy’, ‘integration’ and ‘knowledge-intensity’ as major variables. Taking them as
binary variables, in principle 8 (2³) visions could be developed, but some could be
                                                
 12 The terms of ‘visions’, ‘futures’ or ‘scenarios’ are mostly used as interchangeable ones in the foresight
literature, although ‘scenarios’ might well also have a narrower meaning: a ‘time-line’ of actions and
events leading to a specific end state. If this distinction is applied, it is more appropriate to speak of
visions or futures in the case of TEP. Some of these visions, however, especially the ones developed by
the Transport panel, are rather close to scenarios, narrowly defined.
 13 More recently, macro-scenarios have been developed in South Africa.
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excluded as contradictory one. Thus 3 versions were selected to be developed in more
detail. When these macro futures were discussed – again both at Steering Group
meetings and workshops attended by ‘external’ experts – rather vivid, and sometimes
even heated, debates took place. Eventually the third vision had to be revised to such an
extent that the original structure was not valid anymore. The ‘integration’ variable
became almost indifferent in its original sense: what matters in the finally accepted
visions is the mode (or, quality) of integration, not its existence or extent (as it was
originally defined). More importantly, a new variable, or dimension, changed the whole
structure: the rules, norms, values, attitudes and behaviour in the global settings.
 The underlying concepts of a broad innovation system approach – such as
generation, diffusion and exploitation of knowledge, interaction among the research
community, business, the government and the civil society – play a central role in the
macro visions.
 TEP panels also devoted a significant part of their interest to non-technological
issues, e.g. institutional development and regulatory issues, although most members
were technical experts. Yet, faced with the pressures of the transition process in their
day-to-day work, they understood the importance of non-technological issues. It was
also reflected both in the Delphi-statements and the survey results (Section 4.4).
 The above discussion on the nature of TEP scenarios and the process to leading
them can be captured more orderly by Ian Miles’ taxonomy of scenarios. (Figure 2) TEP
visions were mixed in terms of exploratory vs. normative approaches, and can be
positioned on the borderline between mixed and bottom-up approaches in terms of the
participants of scenario building workshops, that is, somewhere between 5 and 6 in
Figure 2. Again, it was not a planned, favoured method well in advance of the process
leading to TEP visions; this structure simply evolved in a kind of trial-and-error fashion.
 
 Figure 2 about here
 A number of difficulties arose during the scenario-building process. The most
severe one was the unexpected, but sometimes rather strong resistance to this way of
thinking. Two reasons might explain this opposition. First, it was openly stated that
“being scientists, we should think about the future in a scientific manner, and apply
scientific methods to identify the optimal future”; hence, there would be no need for
alternative visions.
 The other, more context-specific, and less vocal reason relates to the legacy of
central planning, which did not promote thinking in terms of alternative futures. (Central
planning actually was very much in favour of the old paradigm of futures research, i.e.
extrapolation based on trend analysis.) Plans only had ‘optimist’ and ‘pessimist’
versions of a single, ‘socially optimal’ future. Influenced by this legacy, most TEP
participants could only think of ‘optimist’, ‘pessimist’ and ‘business-as-usual’ scenarios
at the beginning of TEP.
 These two factors fortified each other, and thus prolonged the process of changing
the mindset of experts affected by them. When pressed hard, these participants came up
with some ‘variations on a theme’ (to meet formally the ‘demand’), but still were unable
to think in terms of qualitatively different alternatives. In these cases, as a ‘last resort’,
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TEP Office staff had to moderate the panel workshops, taking also into account the need
to harmonise macro and meso visions.
 Another, inherent, difficulty was that panels had to analyse a certain field, with its
specific structure (players, institutions, norms, values and attitudes), socio-economic and
technological dynamics, etc., while the macro visions had to deal with issues at a
different level, by definition. For this reason alone, there were obvious constraints to
harmonise the macro and meso (panel) visions. Moreover, TEP panels had already
started working on their own visions, when it was decided that macro futures should
also be built.14 When the first drafts of the various meso and macro futures were
completed, a background paper, entitled Matrix of Scenarios, was commissioned to
analyse their relationships. The conclusions were discussed at length together with
Steering Group members, panel chairs and secretaries, again, both for professional
reasons and keeping a favourable group dynamics. In the light of that, some existing
panel ‘futures’ were revised, and even new ones were developed.
 Comparing the structures of the macro and the panel visions, two panels
(Agribusiness and Food, Transport) achieved a rather close correspondence, two others
(Manufacturing and business processes, IT, telecom and media) partially aligned their
futures with the macro ones, while the remaining 3 ones developed fairly context-
specific structures. (see some examples for these different cases in Figure 3) Not
surprisingly, the ‘outliers’ were those with the least ‘economic-type’ inner logic: Human
resources, Health and life sciences, Natural and built environment. Yet, even these
panels paid close attention to one or two major variables of the macro visions in their
own way, namely ‘strategy’ – or its dependent variable, knowledge-intensity – and/or
the way of ‘integration’ as well as the nature of the global (or European Union) settings.
 
 Figure 3 about here
 
 
 4.4. Policy implications of the Delphi-survey
 Neither the Steering Group nor the TEP Office influenced the panels in any way as far
as the actual content of the Delphi-statements is concerned. No guidelines were issued
as to their nature – technological vs. non-technological – either. If anything, the almost
exclusively technology-oriented Japanese and British questionnaires could possibly
affect the panels when formulating their actual statements. Moreover, most of them not
policy analyst or social scientist were, but technical experts. In this regard, it is worth
highlighting that the number of statements dealing with non-technological issues
exceeded that of the technological ones.15 Moreover, this approach has been validated by
                                                
 14 As already mentioned, for group-dynamics considerations, the Steering Group wanted to avoid the
perception that something was imposed upon the panels, and thus this decision was postponed until panels
themselves requested to formulate macro futures.
 15 It was only possible to categorise five panels’ statements, using the British typology (elucidation,
prototype, first practical use or widespread practical use of a product) as a starting point. Even in these
cases a number of categories had to be added, e.g. human resources, organisational innovation, regulation,
institutions, as all panels followed a context-specific logic – as reflected in the categories in Table 2. Yet,
the remaining two panels (Human resources, Natural and built environment) were so far away even from
this ‘relaxed’ classification, that it did not make sense to include their statements in this exercise.
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the respondents: half of the ‘top 10’ Delphi-statements – those deemed to be the most
favourable ones by the respondents, i.e. with the highest combined socio-economic and
S&T impacts – are non-technological in their nature. (Table 2) It proves beyond doubt
the importance of human resources, regulation and institutions, that is, the salient
relevance of an innovation system approach in a transition country: even those who have
not been influenced by the panel discussions, answered the questionnaire by realising
the significance of these issues. This result is even more striking when juxtaposed with
the currently re-animated linear model of innovation by some Hungarian policy-makers.
(Havas, 2001) The majority of respondents – mostly technical experts (Havas, 2000),
and not social scientists attracted to some ‘fluffy’ theories on the importance of
networks, co-operation and institutions, etc. – put as much weight on these non-
technological issues as on the technological ones.
 
 Table 2 about here
 
 
 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
 TEP was the first foresight programme in a former planned economy. The size of
country and the level of economic and social development played a decisive role in
setting the objectives of the programme: it was driven by broad socio-economic needs
and problems, rather than a narrow S&T agenda. The legacy of the former socio-
economic system had a strong impact on the major decisions on the organisation and
management of TEP. In short, the Steering Group was not directly influenced by the
government agency which initiated and financed the programme; and the panels, too,
were given a great deal of autonomy. These factors, of course, had significant
methodological repercussions.
 As TEP did not start with a detailed, rigid methodological blueprint, the major
decisions were taken jointly by the participants, and thus some important
methodological details evolved throughout the programme. When participants were
faced with various tasks (e.g. formulation of  Delphi-statements, drafting the reports), it
was necessary to rethink the objectives set in advance, and to ‘trim’ them if they seemed
too ambitious. Methods were also adjusted to the Hungarian context: e.g. a large number
of non-technological Delphi-statements were framed by the panels, as opposed to, for
example, the Japanese or British questionnaires. Nor was it foreseen that the scenario-
method would have to be used in a context-specific way in two respects. First, the
uncertainties of the overall transition process, called for the development of macro
visions as a ‘reference frame’ for the panels when they were working on their own
scenarios. Second, the difficulties of applying the scenario technique showed the
endurance of the planning ‘mode’ in people’s mindset; it was therefore an important
means of breaking away from previous ways of thinking about the future. Yet, probably
not all the participants fully grasped the difference between planning and vision
building. (Discussions at various international foresight workshops have also clearly
shown that without being involved in actual scenario-building exercises it is rather
difficult for some policy-makers to understand this difference, in other words the use
and relevance of visions about qualitatively different futures.)
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 Thus, TEP was a participative, continuous learning process from a methodological
point of view, too – with all its advantages and drawbacks. A more rigorous approach,
where all the details are planned well in advance, might have produced more ‘elegant’,
more ‘orderly’ results, but probably at the expense of the reduced commitments from the
participants.
 Hungarian lessons may be applicable to other countries or, at least, they can
highlight some intrinsic dilemmas in foresight. Most of these point to the inescapable
responsibilities of policy-makers.
 First, in spite of an emerging consensus concerning the relevance and use of
foresight as a policy tool, and the importance of the potential process benefits to
strengthen, or shake and re-shape a national system of innovation, in particular, the
specific aims and method have to be tailored to the actual needs of a region, country or
transnational entity. Therefore, different foresight programmes may have dissimilar foci,
ranging from addressing broad socio-economic needs to the identification of priorities in
a narrowly defined S&T context. These would essentially influence the organisation and
management of the process, interested communities and define the relevant tools. Given
the wide choice of aims and techniques, it is of utmost importance to develop a clear
programme concept at the outset, and then design a consistent, thorough project plan.
 It is still likely that some important methodological details would evolve
throughout the programme, and that some objectives will have to be revisited. This is in
line with the general observation that foresight is predominantly a learning process, even
in advanced countries with more experience in foresight, as reflected by the recent
changes for instance in the UK and Germany. Also, there seems to be a trade-off
between methodological rigour and the willingness to participate. Potential foresight
participants might be ‘deterred’ by sophisticated, demanding methods. (Of course
practically any method can be taught at training seminars. Yet, foresight participants
tend to be respected, and hence busy researchers or business people who find difficult to
attend even the panel or Steering Group meetings. Thus it might be hard to convince
them to attend yet more meetings to learn certain sophisticated methods.)
 Second, TEP has also shown, that foresight can be relevant even in a small
country, which is not at the forefront of technological development but rather in the
semi-periphery. A number of factors seem to contradict this conclusion at first glance.
Foresight can be a costly project in terms of money, and even more so if participants’
time required by meetings, workshops and surveys is taken into account. Moreover,
advanced countries, whose experts, in turn, know more about the leading edge
technologies, regularly conduct their foresight programmes, and their ‘products’ –
reports, Delphi-survey results – are readily available. Yet, only a national programme
can position a country in the global context and spark a discussion on how to react to
major trends. Similarly, strength, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) of a
given country would not be analysed by others, let alone broad socio-economic issues.
Process benefits cannot be achieved without a national programme either. Without
these, a country would not be able to improve the quality of life of her population and
enhance her international competitiveness.
 Third, the current structural changes in the world economy and the emergence of
new, global concerns related to environmental, health and demographic issues, imply
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that the scenario method may be relevant not only in transition countries, per se, but also
in countries with long-established, crystallised institutional systems. A growing body of
literature suggests that technological and socio-economic changes are intertwined.
Scenario workshops, therefore, can contribute to a better understanding of these
complex relations, leading to policy proposals, which help in making appropriate
choices in an increasingly complex environment. As TEP has shown, technical experts
are aware of the importance of non-technological issues (human resources, institution-
building, legislation, regulation, organisational innovation). Also, taken alone, the
Delphi-method can facilitate the foresight process only to a limited extent, and thus the
process benefits are bound to be limited, too.
 Fourth, TEP has highlighted some important methodological dilemmas, too.
Apparently, there is a trade-off between:
 the overall coherence of a programme (in terms of the correspondence between
specific panel futures and compatibility between macro and panel ‘futures’) vs.
the inner logic of panel issues (the possibility to tackle the most relevant issues,
developments);
 the need to conduct an easy-to-control (‘centralised’) programme vs. the
autonomy of panels. This is, of course, partially overlapping with the previous
point. A more important caveat is that the perceived autonomy of panels is
obviously context-specific: it is far less important in advanced countries with
stable value systems than in a ‘shaky’ transition country, where decisions on
professional issues used to be dominated by ideological considerations.
 Fifth, other dilemmas disclosed by TEP are partly to do with policy, and partly
methodological in character:
 how to solve the inherent contradiction between the long-term nature of foresight
issues (policy recommendations), on the one hand, and the substantially shorter
time horizon of politicians (and some policy-makers), on the other;
 what organisational set-up is necessary to ease another inherent contradiction
between the need for a strong (but ‘reserved’) political support (or
‘embeddedness’) for a foresight programme on the one hand, and for intellectual,
organisational, financial independence from any government agency, on the
other.
Finally, due to the importance of some process elements (especially awareness-
raising, communication and consensus building) of any foresight programme, ‘insider’
views are indispensable in the analysis of methodological or policy questions. There are
at least three ways to obtain those views: (a) ‘direct’ insider accounts (such as this
article); (b) formal evaluations, based on interviews with participants (‘insiders’) and
other sources of information; (c) a ‘social anthropology’ approach, that is,
commissioning anthropologists or political sociologists to observe the process of
decision-making and implementation as participants. The first one runs the risk to be
overly subjective. The second one is rather costly given the large number of participants,
and thus government agencies are reluctant to finance it; moreover, it is in its infancy as
far as its application to foresight programmes is concerned. Further, it is also bound to
have a specific focus, depending on the agency’s agenda commissioning such a study (in
terms of its major questions, of course, not its content). The third one is not only costly,
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but also likely to be perceived by foresight participants and/or policy-makers as too
‘risky’, too ‘sensitive’, and hence unlikely to occur frequently and in large numbers.
These reasons may limit our abilities to advance knowledge on the policy and
methodological aspects of foresight.
This problem is not explicit in the literature, although usually ‘insiders’ publish
about foresight programmes. The first step would be to start a systematic discussion
about its significance and ways to find solutions. International workshops and
conferences are particularly important in this respect, as they provide fora not only for
scientific discussions on methods and new ideas, but also opportunities to exchange
experiences in an informal, somewhat more ‘blunt’ way.
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Figure 1: Three macro visions
Active strategy Drifting (no strategy)
No major changes in the
global settings (values, norms,




Hungary implements an active
strategy characterised by strong
integration, based on mutual
benefits and high level of
knowledge-intensity
Drifting:
Hungary, having no strategy,
is ‘grabbed’ into the current
system of the international
division of labour along a
low-skills, low-wages path
Fundamental, structural
changes occur in the global
settings
Alternative development:
Hungary is integrated into a new,
‘green’ world by pursuing an
active strategy along a
knowledge-intensive way
Table 1: 6 panels’ recommendations by type (number of recommendations)
Improving human resources 6
Others 7
Application of IT tools 8
Finance* 11
Sector-specific or general policy 15
R&D priorities, innovation policy 17
Institution-building, legislation, regulation 19
Note: Based on a somewhat arbitrary grouping and classification of panels’ policy proposals. One panel (Human
resources) had to be excluded because of the very specific nature of their recommendations.
* Mainly the application of new methods, e.g. public-private partnership
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Figure 2: Taxonomy of scenarios
Top-Down Approaches Mixed Approaches Bottom-Up Approaches
Exploratory
Approaches




or survey instruments to
focus on a few predefined
exploratory scenarios
3) Experts involved in
free-form scenario
workshop, or provide
survey responses  (e.g.
conventional forecast
Delphi) which are grouped


























them, identify key issues




(e.g. goals Delphi) which
are grouped by statistical
methods to yield scenarios
Source: Ian Miles: “Scenarios for TAP-ASSESS”, 1999, PREST, cited in James P. Gavigan and Fabiana Scapolo:
“FOREN Workpackage 3, final report”, Appendix III, http://foren.jrc.es











State supply: uniform, cheap,
equally available





private spending: 3.0-3.2 %
Reduced public expenditures
 limited health services
Health expenditures:
~ 10 % of GDP
Deepening gap between
the poor and rich
Results Public finance dominates Rate of public finance:
60-65%
Increasing role of private
finance




Preservation of health is
not a priority
Basic health services for all Limited services by the state,






















Role of the state Active, promotes
development
Passive, weak Passive, weak









„Garden Hungary” „Drifting” „Green alternative”






Integration Local and global
actors, mutually
beneficial co-operation




Knowledge-intensity High + wide-ranging High, but only in a small
circle
High + wide-ranging





High: state + civilian
self-organisation











Table 2: Technological vs. non-technological Delphi-statements (number of statements)







A T A T A T A T A T A T
Elucidation 9 – 2 – 11 –
First practical use 2 – 22 – 11 1 11 2 46 3
Widespread practical use 12 2 26 4 38 6 24 5 100 17
S&T developments 15 4 15 4
Risk factors 12 7 12 7
Human resources 10 1 8 – 18 1
Institutions 12 – 6 – 18 –
Regulation 8 – 6 – 2 – 3 2 19 2
Services in Hungary 9 3 9 3
Future services 15 2 15 2
Information society 7 1 7 1
Organisational innovation 20 6 16 1 11 1 47 8
Others 4 – 12 2 16 2
Consumers’ behaviour 16 – 16 –
Total technological 23 2 15 4 48 4 51 7 35 7 172 24
Total non-technological 42 8 37 6 34 6 44 3 20 3 177 26
Legend: A = all statements; T = Top 10 statements; [  ] = counted as technological statement
